

Organisational Development with the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) Bangladesh

A Ten Year Review

Volume 1

1992 - 2003



Agricultural Support Service Project (ASSP)



**Agricultural Services Innovation and
Reform Project (ASIRP)**

October 2003

Acronyms

ACR	Annual Confidential Report
AEO	Assistant Extension Officer of DAE
ASIRP	Agricultural Services Innovation and Reform Project
ASSP	Agricultural Sector Support Project
ATI	Agricultural Training Institute of DAE
BS	Block Supervisor
CERDI	Central Extension Resources Development Institute of DAE
DAE	Department of Agricultural Extension
DFID	Department for International Development of UK (formerly ODA O verseas D evelopment A dministration)
GoB	Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh
HRD	Human Resource Development
HRM	Human Resource Management
ICR/PCR	Investment or Project Completion Report of the World Bank
IDA	International Development Agency of the World Bank
IDS	Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University, UK
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy paper of GoB
IR	Inception Report of ASIRP
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice Survey
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
NAEP	New Agricultural Extension Policy(1996)
NAP	National Agricultural Policy (1999) of GoB
PAD	Project Appraisal Document of World Bank
PEC	Project memorandum of DFID (submitted for project approval)
PP	Project Proforma of GOB
PoA	Plan of Action of NAP(2003) of GoB
REA	Revised Extension Approach
T&V	Training and Visit Extension
TNA	Training Needs Analysis
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis
UAO	Upazila Agricultural Extension Officer (formerly TAO Thana A gricultural O fficer)
WB	World Bank

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Foreword

DFID involvement in more than 10 years of support to public sector agricultural extension is drawing to a close. It was felt that significant information on successes and failures has been generated, and that a history of involvement would provide a consolidated record and provide important learning. The motive for this is partially caused by increasing recognition that project based approaches (particularly process projects) have a tendency to regularly re-invent earlier approaches. Often this is due to the lack of an institutional home for information, the time and area bound focus of projects, and the lack of institutional memory.

This series of documents has been prepared with the considerable advantage of hindsight. They also take advantage of the fact that there has been an extensive period of engagement at all levels (village to policy), recognising that significant resources have been available (approximately £ 52.76 million over 10 years, of which £ 22.64 million from DFID).

The series of 10-year review papers comprise:

1. Public Sector Extension in Bangladesh
2. Human Resource Interventions in DAE
3. Working With NGOs
4. Organisational Development

The views presented in the review papers are those of the ASIRP TA Team, and not necessarily those of DAE/MoA/GoB, any of the ASSP or ASIRP donors or the managing agents.

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Introduction

ASSP was perceived as being involved in the reform of agricultural extension in Bangladesh. It was a co-financed project and had some conditionalities placed on it by the World Bank – this was the need to decrease the number of the field level workforce (BSs) either by a policy of retrenchment or, what in fact resulted, imposing a moratorium on further recruitment and replacement of BSs. ASSP was largely concerned with the movement away from the traditional T&V system of agricultural extension to a more needs based system. However, the World Bank Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) for ASSP in 1991 states that after supporting the previous system “with millions of ¹SDRs spent.... the system is ineffective”. The movement away from the T&V approach was enshrined in the Revised Extension Approach of DAE. The transition to changing the extension approach was not quick and there was considerable controversy and blockage along the way. A similar pattern was evident for the role in contracting NGOs to provide services. Separate documents cover extension and partnerships.

A bridging project (ASSP 1A) in 1996-97 sought to establish a new policy framework for agricultural extension (broader than DAE alone).

ASIRP was identified as a logical follow on from this, where any gains would be institutionalised and agricultural services in the public sector would follow the principles of the New Agricultural Extension Policy.(NAEP). The project would move beyond the narrow confines of considering the largest extension service provider(DAE) in isolation, and towards more co-ordinated and integrated service delivery in a broader natural resources framework. The two projects, ASSP and ASIRP progressed towards an institutional/organisational development “process” project. ASIRP was concerned with “change management” activities within a line agency(DAE) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). The question remains as to what ASSP actually changed and supported and what reforms and innovations emerged, as a result of ASIRP and as compared to the objectives of ASSP at entry.

This reflects purpose of this paper, to examine the results – successes and failures - of this period. It also, with the considerable benefit of hindsight, looks at the evolution of the two projects and the impact in organisational development terms on DAE. Some of the interventions of the two projects have been targeted at HRD/HRM. Again, there is a separate report on HRD/HRM over the ASSP/ASIRP period. To put the interventions in a framework a general definition of organisational development would be the - “the increased capability of an organisation (or groups of organisations) to achieve and sustain an improved level of performance in meeting its (their) objectives “ Performance being influenced by internal factors and the external context. The internal factors involve structure, systems and processes, culture and people. The external factors include the influence of the constitutional/legal framework, social factors, economic factors, public interest, and the objectives and role of government. The explicit agenda for reform was ::the

¹ This is probably the only statement that reflects the demise of the World Bank supported T&V system but there is a lack of data/ argument to support this recommendation. The experience in Bangladesh merely reflects a world-wide shift in the late 80s on the role/ delivery of public sector extension. In fact M&E of projects in the late 80s, show that DAE was achieving about 10% of direct one to one contact as planned


concept of improving the performance of DAE as a more responsive service provider. and a movement to use the DAE experience to stimulate change beyond the DAE crop based extension service alone.

A Sign of the Times

The early to mid 90s was the period when many of the ideas and concepts from management theory were being considered in terms of the performance of large government bureaucracies in the developing world. Strengthening the government role focussed on issues of public expenditure planning, monitoring and control, revenue collection, policy and planning capabilities, decentralisation and the clarification of the role of government in service delivery. This was particularly concerned with the role of government in delivering public goods and services. The need to establish effective management and organisations with clear objectives were paramount. Donor priorities were to ensure lasting impact through effective structures, appropriate skills development, effective systems, processes and best practices, improvement in decision making and increases in productivity and quality of service. The thrust was to create learning organisations. The donor aim was also to improve and strengthen their relationship with Government at the policy level. Institutions were important and, to some, were more important than policy *per se*. There was almost a utopian view of the value system where quality would underpin all other values – such as dedication, decisiveness, customer satisfaction, technical excellence in terms of innovation and capability, team work (shared visions, and mutual support) and empowered people within the organisation.

There is evidence in Bangladesh that whereas broader public sector reform was seen as priority by donors, HR issues and other more difficult issues were often swept under the table – at best being quoted as a risk/assumption of the project logframe rather than a specific project output: The difficult decisions were very often concealed by parallel approaches rather than by direct dialogue between donors and GoB. The overriding view being that GoB was not delivering, and in terms of agricultural extension, other service providers needed to be developed. Therefore donors funded NGOs either directly or through GoB projects to expand the base of alternative service providers. An example of this is the whole movement towards partnerships, with partnerships being clouded by parallel and potentially unsustainable approaches (certainly in terms of GoBs ability to contract out or contract in). However, the result is that in many service delivery sectors there are clear comparative advantages to other service providers – the large NGOs – in both social development and technical extension service delivery. For example, BRAC in smallholder livestock development and PROSHIKA in social forestry. These gains have taken about 15 years and with advice and inputs now linked to access to micro-credit, there is a tendency for some NGO schemes to be more equivalent to private sector advisory services (with costs absorbed in the overall package). However, there is perhaps not such a clear cut comparative advantage in crops extension. The role of public sector extension services has changed from the T&V system (donor promoted) with its large public sector staffing to more needs based approaches. There has been no movement away from a grass roots based system of public sector extension agents (the Block Supervisor) – For NGOs, the demands on DAE is to often provide training. The Block Supervisor is still there at the forefront of public sector crops extension.

The main finding over the period is that whereas quality of information and other supply side interventions may have improved - there remains an underlying issue of quantity of service and access. Given the expenditure under projects these remain issues that have hardly been addressed at the national level² The reforming zeal of donors (via project approaches) has, at best, only been partly achieved, and at considerable cost. There remains a clear reform issue of the role of government vis a vis the private sector at all levels. The role of Government in the provision of public extension remains the subject of much debate.



The theoretical basis of the change management model considered the need to develop an effective organisation that leads to improved performance, and that a number of external and internal factors needed to be managed/changed. Figure 1 shows such a network but it should be recognised that there is often not a clear cut ,linear cause and effect relationship – the relationships are multi-faceted . It is also evident that a number of building blocks need to all be in place before success can be achieved. The model also considered that given the ability to manage the external environment , with strong leadership, a clear mission and strategy and changes in the culture, then this could lead to sweeping transformation of the organisation. The logic of the framework leads into a classical strategic planning approach where a short statement explaining why the institution exists (and the values it wishes to adopt) is the basis of the plan – the so called Mission Statement .The prevailing issue was that the culture of the organisation needed to change and the system of shared values and beliefs were accepted without question and was focussed on the achievement of clear objectives . To this needed to be added the vision for DAE – a picture of a future state for DAE or an image of a possible and

² ASIRP 2003 Quality and Quantity of Extension Services

desirable future that is shared, realistic, credible and attractive. In the absence of a shared vision and a common understanding it is hardly surprising that the rules of the game were never agreed. TA and donors whilst accepting that the process would be slow, also believed that significant gains were being achieved. In reality, progress was slow on all fronts – at the technical, managerial and administrative level

Why has progress been difficult to define?

The first factor is that agricultural extension is a service delivery that either cuts across the crops sector alone (one interpretation) or across several sub sectors of the overall rural development framework. It is difficult to show cause and effect in agricultural extension service delivery alone. This is a universal problem and has led to much disenchantment with agricultural extension services world-wide. As the definition of organisational development infers it is either a single organisation or groups of organisations. The implication of the “groups of organisations” for the NAEP is that the development trajectory follows in parallel in associated organisations. In Bangladesh, this has proven to be a critical constraint (due to compartmentalisation at the macro level). Progress in adoption of the NAEP, suggests that a strategy of scaling up of the successes of the revised extension approach in DAE with the other closely related service providers may have proven to be more logical next step before the rather large step of defining a new cross sector policy for an expanded (for Bangladesh) vision of agricultural extension. This may have proved a more suitable strategy for DFID as they were supporting fisheries and agricultural extension and a more programmatic approach would have allowed for greater influence and increased scale/co-ordination in the service delivery area. Very often, as mentioned earlier donors funded parallel approaches to resolve the problems in development planning and implementation of projects

The early days of ASSP was faced with “the challenge of moving away from a T&V system to a more needs based bottom up system”. The early focus of TA was clearly on issues of crop extension services and crop specific issues. There was a vision of a future state of DAE extension services, that in itself was not threatening but would change the culture (the way things are done) in DAE. The approach suggested could be described as bottom-up meeting top down. This vision was a project perception. The realisation that DAE was part of a system also became self evident to DAE and was further demonstrated by the homestead development component. This component of ASSP was faced with real issues of access to GO services. The responses of the component was to seek partnerships with NGOs. Therefore, one vision of what was the desired future state of crops(DAE) extension was evolving into general issues of GO service delivery and targeting. This was coupled with a partnership approach based on complementary skills in service providers. The conclusion was that the task of developing social/group development skills in DAE was not required as these were better suited to be provided by NGO in partnership. GO-NGO partnerships pre-dated this component but were always based on contracted “joint venture” approaches Working with groups became the focus of DAE and the delivery of NGO “group skills” is still usually based on payment for services This was a response to the change from a T&V system in a revised extension approach based on groups rather than individual contact, and to some extent was a

pragmatic approach to a moratorium on further recruitment of field staff (Block Supervisors) and the need for greater coverage(quantity of service). DAE had, by the mid 90s, become responsive in technical terms to its external environment . The TA focus in ASSP had been very much based on an expert or doctor-patient roles. By the mid 90s, the change in DAE could be summarised by the view that it was then helpful to see extension as both a system and the set of functions performed by that system. For example, the set of functions includes :

- transferring technology in many directions and by multiple methods for sustainable agricultural production, transformation, and marketing;
- transferring management to mobilise and organise farming, rural groups, and communities; and
- transferring capacity to educate, build human resources, and enhance local capacity, for example, in integrated pest management, market information, farm management, and in negotiating financial, input, and market services.

The agricultural extension system includes all public and private institutions that transfer, mobilise and educate rural people as distinct from a service or single organisation that traditionally provided advice only Current thinking has moved away from this system approach to defining extension as a “ knowledge and information support function for rural people that has a broader role than just providing agricultural advice” With poverty reduction being a focus, it is now suggested “that public sector extension be focussed on those the market has left behind”³

From the ASSP perspective, DAE was now following a Revised Extension Approach(REA) and this was reflected in the vision of the policy and strategy. The status of the vision was that no decisions were required as the extension system would evolve in a more or less unthreatening fashion The missing link was still the need to test this approach across the whole organisation. The challenge in any pilot (as in ASSP and the interim project) is to gain acceptance across all levels . The excessive project led nature of DAE made this a difficult task and it is questionable whether the early gains of the REA were fully internalised by the time that ASIRP was conceived. There was still a long way to go to make the farmer the centre of development Because of this, the NAEP was premature. The NAEP was developed in a vacuum as there was no tangible National Agricultural Policy. The system definition and approach again did not represent a challenge, in fact it gave a possible justification for an expansion of DAE’s sphere of influence

The success of ASSP in bringing about a change in technical approach, suggested that the gains needed to be consolidated and that behavioural change was required of staff. The switch was therefore to depart on a major process of reform of agricultural extension. The point of departure was to get a policy framework accepted by GoB and develop a strategy for DAE as a basis for performance improvement The hard aspects of OD were clearly thought to be in place – the structures, a clear shared understanding between GoB/Donor and the project, the systems, the skills

³ Quotes from a World Bank AKIS sponsored workshop on Extension and Rural Development – Converging Views for Institutional Approaches held in November 2002

The prevailing lessons learnt from ASSP was the realisation that everybody should follow the DAE lead and that the NAES and the issue of service delivery transcended the boundaries of DAE alone. This project-led approach resulted in an implementation strategy for the NAEP and a DAE response to the NAEP in the form of a strategic plan. Other policies for Fisheries, Livestock and Rural Development were largely outdated and often were policies on paper. The policy process in ASSP was consultative but did not go far enough in securing full stakeholder participation. Policy formulation in Bangladesh had traditionally been a donor driven process – this time it was a donor project driven process. The main issue has been stated that there was no ownership of the NAEP in DAE and the problems of travelling across bureaucratic boundaries resulted in no ownership in other GOs at the national level. In addition, given the changes in DAE in the REA, the NAEP clearly shifted the onus on other GO to respond in a similar fashion – there was no inherent threat in the NAEP to DAE’s standing and in fact ASIRP clearly reinforced DAE’s standing in the hierarchy of GOs involved in service delivery in the natural resource sector. The emphasis of change management turned to the need for TA to operate as a process consultancy – with the role of the expert and the doctor-patient role being regarded as unnecessary and out dated given the perception that DAE clearly knew where it was going as evidenced by the DAE Mission statement. This process approach also assumed that there was capacity in the organisation and the organisation was capable of making decisions. However, there remained a lack of an agreed vision between ASIRP and DAE, and within DAE as a whole. The donor agenda was explicit in project documents – the movement towards a more pluralistic approach to service delivery and the need for a more sectoral approach, with the sectoral approach being defined by the principles embedded in the NAEP.

What else was happening?

Given the limited evidence of success of DAE in being able to manage a process of change in re-inventing itself, the emphasis was also placed on examining the internal factors that influenced the ability of DAE to be an effective organisation. Many projects have had an interest in influencing these internal factors. The response is usually supply side dominated – more training, improved systems(M&E, MIS etc). ASSP had also become involved in issues of structure, staffing levels, job descriptions and personnel administration/management. This often resulted in “gains” for the project but often led to questions of sustainability of project interventions and more importantly raised issues of change management beyond the boundaries of DAE. This manifests itself in the way both the MoA and a line agency(DAE) interact with the “ rules of business” for the public administration. In DAE’s case, this wall is there and perhaps the lesson should be that change in a technocracy is easier than a change management process that cuts across the rules of business. of a large bureaucracy.(the GoB Civil Service/Public Administration). Motivation was treated as a transactional factor where the promise of access to training/study tours overseas bought commitment to project objectives. Projects became even more important as sources of reward either in terms of status or as giving other opportunities. HRM/D was shifting away from issues of developing skills to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation to project led approaches that were supply driven. Training needs assessments may have considered skill gaps but ignored motivation and attitudinal gaps. The so called rationalist approach in considering the factors that are important in a given context

and culture, and then working on those factors alone suffers because of the inter-relationship of many factors – in the face of poor motivation, training alone becomes redundant, systems that require relatively high inputs in terms of time and consumables are unlikely to be sustained by GoB where routine O&M funds are usually provided by projects.

The Inception Report of ASIRP highlights a number of issues – the lack of co-operation in other GOs, and in other projects with the same donor,- the lack of accountability or ownership were beginning to emerge

So what happened to the process consultancy role in DAE?

The major problem is that the use of TA in such a role does not remove the need to achieve outputs – after all a process converts inputs into outputs and outcomes. Outputs are very difficult to define when there is no shared vision and values .This led to the image of ASIRP as doing its own thing but not really being part of DAE The lack of shared vision makes decision making and knowing where you are on the road difficult. Given the inevitable iterations it is useful to know when the spiral is out of control. Who was expected to take charge of change? In an implementation process that envisages DAE as mediating beyond its boundaries in terms of policy then the ability to achieve ownership beyond and within its boundary is crucial. The role of TA as a process consultant does not work where there is low decision making capacity(or the will to make decisions) in the system or where there are high potential threats. The shift then went towards the believe that strong leadership could drive the transformation of DAE. – with much store placed on developing a strong and motivated top level of the hierarchy to achieve this

The conclusion is that the project design and structure could not succeed.- time is not the issue. Success within a project framework was only likely to have come with a large external shock to the Public Administration system Early gains with DAE on it's REA had not been fully consolidated . On the principle of what's in it for me (WIIFM)there was no likelihood of bringing MoA or other GO service providers fully on board. The target was improved performance of service delivery – and this was somewhat neatly captured under ASIRP Output 3. There was no institutional or organisational analysis and more importantly there was no common understanding of the future role of public extension services. The former probably because the weakness of a stand alone intervention in DAE and the latter because the threat would be real. The dominance of a time bound project intervention resulted in no common understanding or vision Where ASIRP was located and the somewhat tenuous nature of the gains in institutional terms, coupled with the lack of comparative progress in other agricultural extension services made the foundations of the project very weak .and undermined the projects exclusive reliance on process consultancy. The other reality, (despite the analogy that civil service reform in the UK took many years and the process was always likely to be slow), was that a service oriented civil service in Bangladesh was not evident in the first place. The external environment in terms of the entitlement of all citizens to services, as specified in the GoB Constitution, was never on the agenda

Did it matter?

NGOs especially the larger national and international organisations were often taking over the technical aspects of extension service delivery. Donors funded alternatives. Over the period of the 90s, the NGOs moved from being partners to potential competitors or viable alternatives. However, the political choice of GoB to look at issues of contracting out service delivery was not evident. The position was still based on a donor view on what should be a public good/service and this does still not necessarily coincide fully with the view of GoB. This is reflected in the iPRSP with “the returns to public sector extension and research” stated as being “high”. However, the IPRSP does clearly move away from a one size fits all approach to public sector services, although the specific roles of the NGO and private sector are unclear

Institutional Appraisal -where did we start and where are we now?

The PEC submission for ASSP (Phase 1A) quite incorrectly states that DAE has established structures and processes to respond to the larger policy framework. .Therefore the starting point was that DAE was a sound institution, policies were in place and all ASIRP had to do was mediate on process.

ASIRP essentially took the approach that the process was far more important than the outcome – and that a softly -softly approach with facilitation skill was the preferred option. The reality was that ASIRP was designed one way and implemented in another way , with ASIRP still doing the strategic thinking and DAE making no decisions

There are number of factors that all influence the performance of DAE involving the people, the structure, the systems and processes. The factors of leadership, mission/strategy/vision, culture and management of changes in the external environment, can all be termed factors that can transform the institution when there is commitment and ownership by all staff. Focus on these factors can bring about rapid changes in the institution - however, a top down bias is evident. Competence in leadership and a clear mission and strategy can bring about positive support for performance improvement. The lower factors are termed as being more transactional in nature, with the focus on a gradual improvement in performance and change. It is often easier for projects to focus on factors that appear more real, e.g. the tasks and abilities of staff(job descriptions/training needs), and to improve skills by a training programmes. This may lead to training being important in developing individual performance improvement, but a neglect of the other factors, may result in no improvement in the performance of DAE as a whole.. Similarly, if the systems are regarded in isolation from the other factors - a project based approach to MIS is unlikely to succeed in isolation of the other factors

The broad framework of the approaches can be conceptualised as follows, based on a classical organisational theory approach

The External Environment - any outside condition or situation that influences the performance of the institution

For example, Are there any major GOB initiatives planned or current which will impact on the institutions ability to implement the chosen strategy? GOB policy decentralisation had been an ongoing development issue in Bangladesh during the 90s. Zero growth on staffing emerged as a result of ASSP. The other areas faced by ASSP:

:Does DAE monitor, evaluate and understand the needs, priorities and expectations of recipients of its services? Moving towards more participatory client focused approaches. More recently, policy on public participation and the iPRSP has emerged

DAE after 10 years has produced its own strategic plan that recognises quite clearly the external policy framework

Mission and Strategy - the central purpose of DAE and the way in which DAE plans to achieve that purpose.

For example, Does DAE have a clear mission in terms of delivery of some services? What strategy is to be followed? Is the mission internalised or merely a poster on the wall?

The policy-strategy continuum was essentially a project driven ASSP approach. The mission was at best rhetorical. The flaws in the strategy and mission was finally recognised in DAEs planning for the next strategic plan in 2002.

Vision must also be added here as the picture of the future state of DAE

The major issue was that there was no vision as to the future role of public sector extension. There was never a clear decision on the core functions of DAE and no shared vision on the role of DAE. The rhetoric of projects and the field reality were miles apart. This role of public sector extension is still debated with the concept of pluralism in service delivery now relegated to discussions on the maturity of the system and the opinions of experts shifting to a more pro poor focus in recognition of the growing trend in the development of poverty reduction strategies.

ASSP/ASIRP project intervention has only achieved incremental change in the last 2 years

Leadership - the overall direction of DAE

For example, Are senior managers committed to changes in service delivery?

Leadership was consigned to a series of training interventions that mainly ignored the prevailing culture. Change management was seen as creating a "good" leader and hoping that good decisions would be made. – the process was more important than the outcome

Culture - a collection of rules, values and principles that exists within DAE and guide behaviour. This is the way DAE does things

For example, behaviour is a very important measure for judging performance

ASSP(Phase 1) and the early stages of ASIRP pursued cultural change with zeal and motivational vigour. Largely importing tenets that were incapable of being understood

Structure - the way in which functions and staff resources in DAE are configured to identify and confirm levels of responsibility, authority and accountability

For example, Is there an organisation chart showing functions and responsibilities? Are reporting relationships clear and understood? How are activities monitored in the functions or regions? Does the institution have the capacity to adapt to new demands? How do levels of authority and responsibility fit in with the concepts of decentralisation?

Some gains in the area of work planning, delegated authorities and bottom up approaches in 10 years. Irrational expectations of "big bang" gains were promulgated by ASIRP .

Management Practices - the nature of management behaviour in DAE in using the available resource to implement strategies

For example, To what extent does planning still exhibit a top down bias? Is cross functional working promoted?

Management practices and skills have improved but has the service?

Systems - standardised policies and mechanisms in DAE to undertake agreed activities efficiently and effectively .

For example,

Systems will include planning and monitoring, MIS, Human Resource ,HRM/HRD, Financial/Budgeting Systems, Administration, the delivery of field services, regulatory activities.

Project based interventions by many donors have all contributed to the lack of standardised systems. The only standards are the GoB Public Administration and rules of business. Information systems based on demands from above rather than information that influences management

Work Unit Climate - the collective current impressions, expectations and feeling of staff members in particular functions and areas of DAE

For example,

What are the views on the future role of DAE?

What would they like to change?

What are their concerns?

Genuine concerns appear to be considered. Some indications that a future changed role is emerging but this would not fit 100% with donor views.

Task Requirements/Individual Skills and Abilities - the level, accuracy and appropriateness of the definition of jobs/posts in DAE

For example, Are there Job Descriptions in DAE ? Do they identify tasks of the job? Do staff have the skills required for a changing role ?Is there a training policy and HR plan to meet the gaps in skills? And does this plan consider resources and motivation gaps

Job Descriptions written and re-written by many projects. Skills are difficult to define in the face of a lack of clarity on role and the future structure. Some indication that minor gains are emerging via the second DAE strategic plan

Individual Needs and Values/ Motivation - Why individuals join, stay and the capacity/capability to improve their performance in DAE

For example, Are there mechanisms to recognise and reward good performance? What cultural constraints apply? Have changes in other opportunities available to people changed the staff profile? What motivates staff ? – Is the use of incentives sustainable or is it used as a means to buy short term commitment?

The issue of incentives is an underlying problem that deserves more serious consideration. However, since no decision had been made on defining the function of DAE it is very difficult to build incentives into the system. This may sound a bit irrelevant as surely DAE does extension only – but DAE is also a producer and seller of inputs and a regulator. This is considered in more detail in the HRD/HRM paper

Where are we on the continuum?

Appendix 1 provides a subjective assessment of where DAE is on a scale of 1 –5
The Exit Strategy

The plan for exit of TA was defined as early as the Inception Report of ASIRP. The major elements of thinking are outlined in Appendix 2, along-with the comments of the Team leader ASSP 1 &1A, and the Institutional Development Adviser of ASIRP. This exit strategy is also quoted in the work undertaken by IDS on behalf of DFID, as an example of good practice. Specifically the IDS work quotes the Sustainability Strategy as

- Train those who remain
- Write things down
- Build ownership and understanding
- Pin down specific commitments
- Marshall other resources behind change
- Build stakeholder expectations

The project culture started “supporting a process of organisational change” that “differs from traditional projects”. It does not involve implementation of a specific technical intervention with clear and predictable activities and outputs . **Rather , it requires facilitation of a process of support to the client organisation in taking its own decisions and actions.** The project by the time of the Inception Report and the field work for the IDS report had over 5 years of experience in the institutional development domain in DAE. The Inception Report effectively changed the goalposts for ASIRP from the original design. Reference to evaluating risks and measuring success are clearly specified in the exit and sustainability strategies.

However, following the 5 years of intervention it would appear that no critical evaluation had been done, as many of the risks appear to be killer assumptions and were clearly not manageable in the context of ASIRP.

The timing of ASIRP needs to be set in the context of a drift away from blueprint projects to process projects and a move to more participatory development. This is encapsulated by the process approach being founded on the premise that the overall goal of the project is shared with the client, partners and the beneficiaries with whom the project is working. In order to ensure such a commitment it is essential to work with and not against the interests and motivations of all those stakeholders who form the client's community. The blueprint project would be on a fixed trajectory and the process project would be gradualist and step by step and lead to common understanding and mutual agreement of the stakeholders. It would be easily discernible that there was movement towards the ultimate project purpose. In other words outputs are not fixed but there are outputs. ASIRP was perceived as being a process project because it was about strengthening existing, and establishing new, relationships with and between stakeholders and that **decision** points along the way would define the nature and timing of project outputs and activities. Participation would be the route for personal development of DAE staff and there would be a reversal in learning where the client(DAE) becomes the expert and the expert(the TA) becomes the facilitator. Participation would be the tool for building capacity across the whole organisation of DAE. Issues of a conceptual vacuum and potential pitfalls were not recognised.

The more participatory and empowering process approach envisaged under ASIRP would be associated with high transaction costs. This is evidenced by the costs of the Change Management Fora. However, at the end of the day **outputs DAE decisions** would be made. The premise was clearly that a gradualist approach would not be successful, (progress, learn, consolidate) and the big bang from within was sought. The strategy was couched in risks but by 2000 (with 2 years of ASIRP left), the exist strategy was clear to ASIRP TA only. -facilitation had clearly not worked. Cultural change is suggested as underpinning the gains. But after 5 years of intervention, the core function of DAE was not defined and agreed – issues of changing the way things are done was clouded by a lack of what should DAE be doing in the first place- the first DAE strategy did not answer this key question. In fact there was no learning as the way things could be done in the field was different to the way things could be done in Dhaka

Conclusions

Overall the job is half done after >10years To some extent incremental change gets more difficult as you progress to the ideal learning and responsive organisation

The interventions in the project have been inward looking either by design or by default. The broader picture even with GoB has provided constraints that would effectively inhibit any change process. GoB- TA/donor policy dialogue was absent and there was no indication of any shared or common understanding of objectives. For DAE, ASIRP is a DAE project as ASSP was before it. This can be relegated to the need for time and concern for process but the building blocks were not present. –

there was certainly no evidence of DAE willing to invest in the process or recognising the problems. Many of the issues remain today. but there is evidence of a new horizon in DAE. The external shock that might stimulate change could be structural changes at the micro level in terms of service delivery arrangements via Local Government. This should change the role of the centre/macro level to more of policy planning, monitoring and regulatory role. A sectoral programme for service delivery (not a stand alone project in any one Agency) with budgetary support and conditionality would have been more appropriate in terms of ownership, accountability, and shared values/vision between donors and all of GoB. This may have led to incremental success and managed the risks better.

There have been gains and although these gains initially appeared tenuous, they have been increasingly internalised in DAE. One could argue that DAE has been a learning organisation on its own terms. For example, it is capable of reading donor intentions and the general trends in the GoB bureaucracy and, as the pipeline of projects dries up, change its approach. This does leave an interesting perspective – how far are donors willing to invest in the change process?. The work undertaken by IDS for DFID⁴ indicates issues of ownership, compartmentalisation, lack of consensus but basically recommends the process approach followed by the project up to 2000. It is critical of the use of technical experts rather than “institutional change” experts both in the donor and the TA Team. It also suggests that evaluations done by the donor are often isolated from the local partners and as such does not develop a shared approach. The clear response from DAE is that “the focus turned into TA institutional experts being provided who told them what to do and then left them to get on with it “. This was hardly applying negotiation and facilitation skills but substituting one traditional expert role for another. The project never developed into a process project. Meanwhile, DAE had not established its core function as an extension service providers. There was considerable effort put into developing capacity in DAE and others to absorb the a new development intervention (institutional). This can lead to over-stretching the institutions capacity and lead to goal diversion/goal dilution. The new institutional activity led to a weakening of DAEs commitment to its changed purpose. This essentially undermined the sense of ownership and capacity development and did not result in a willingness to change. The Policy Change paradigm is even more interesting – ASSP supported DAE in developing the NAEP and this clearly aligned implementation with Local Government structures. The interim project and ASIRP then followed a road of developing structures that by-passed the main role of government on local development planning. Implementation of the policy was drawn back into DAE and ASIRP followed the traditional project based (single line agency) approach. The belief was that other stakeholders would surely join if the higher levels instructed them.

The international debate on the role of public sector extension is on going with a great deal of emphasis on the need for a mature system before pluralism in service delivery can be developed. The public role should now focus on poverty and enhanced services. These are statements of international experts in 2002. In an effort to justify the existence of public sector extension, many opportunities have been looked at. In Bangladesh, the farmers response to the T&V system was that BS

⁴ Changing Organisations for Agricultural Extension in Bangladesh: strategies for change- Pasteur, K. IDS for DFID 2002

often visited without bring anything new. Today, the BS have a demand for new ideas to extend to farmers. The need for a flow of innovations and ideas has also resulted in the expansion of extension-information linkages as part of the approach. The use of extensionists as general rural development agents aligned with Local Government has re-merged. Many project interventions that involve successful approaches have little prospect of fiscal sustainability and often would require a considerable time to be replicated country wide

The box below highlights the debate on reforming extension in Bangladesh- This paper has not entered into the debate on definitions of institutional change vs. organisational development. If we take the institution of public sector extension then there have been some gains and the rules of the game have changed recently, probably more due to changes in the external environment. These include a perceived movement from projects to programmes, the drying up of the pipeline of donor projects and the opportunity of the I-PRSP.

Reforming Agricultural Extension Services ?

In the late 1980's –early 90s as quoted in the ICR of previous investments by IDA in agricultural extension - despite millions of SDR invested in the T&V system it has not been a success and does not cater for "poor " farmers Therefore, by inference the public sector was not meeting the needs of smaller or poorer farmers At this time about \$ 33 million had been invested in the IDA Extension and Research project II from the late 70s onwards (in addition to E&R I). Monitoring showed that DAE was making direct contact with 10% of farmers as envisaged under the T&V system DAE is confronted with a world wide trend of disillusionment of T&V. They are however not part of a shared vision of what should be the role of public sector agricultural extension

The period from 1992 – Mid 90s under ASSP is spent in refining the extension approaches. DAE are faced with a shrinking field staff base as a result of the moratorium on recruitment/replacement as an IDA conditionality but since expansion of the service was undertaken in the 80s – natural wastage and retirements means that over the next 10 years (i.e. by 2002 – the numbers of field staff would reduce by 15-25%). There is slow acceptance of the Revised Extension Approach(REA) in DAE. The role of DAE is still fixed on **all farmers** and they will follow a range of more participative needs based approaches. DAE will also use mixed extension methodologies –for example , make increasing use of media. However, field demonstrations are still part of the approach. By the mid 90s , the use of groups becomes the main extension approaches The REA is consolidated in a DAE extension manual supported by ASSP. This establishes a difference to T&V.

The demands for new skills are supported by ASSP training interventions. The Independent monitoring undertaken by ULG for ASSP indicates that direct contact has risen to 17%. Targeting remains an outstanding issue. At HQ,DAE has become an increasingly large project implementation unit. Projects do their own thing and become part of a parallel structure. ASSP struggles to find a genuine organisation wide home but has a significant role because it is a well resourced project Debates on structure and role are clouded and remain unresolved.

Mid 90s to 1999: The next step is the perception that weaknesses in terms of the existing agricultural(crops) policy framework , requires the development of a new agricultural extension policy. This is supported by ASSP and clearly sets crops extension within the context of all natural resource based public extension services (i.e. it regards extension within a broader definition of agriculture). The original policy documentation and consultation process is clearly based on establishing linkages with existing structures within the Local Government framework. (Separate papers on extension and partnerships refer) The donor perception is that the structure, skills and process (all the building block?) are established in DAE for them to engage in a process of reform and innovation of agricultural extension services. Projects are becoming divorced from the mainstream DAE structures and continue to provide resources not capable of being financed or sustained by GoB. The role of Project Directors further undermines core functions. Projects are perceived as "islands of excellence". DAE, like other GO ESPs, is still producing and delivering inputs The success of ASSP is to generate a bottom up planning system within a project framework that is adopted by DAE There are questions on whether ASIRP(given its wider brief) should be located in DAE.

1999 –2003 ASIRP starts in a framework that has changed. In response to the policy DAE produces a long list of generic objectives for the next 3 years in their Strategic Plan and the linkages in the NAEP with Local Government are ignored and parallel structures developed. The first input of the expatriate TA on Institutional Development reports – What is the role of DAE? and suggests linkages with LG structures. The combining of with the Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control(Ribec) project with ASIRP should provide useful linkages to more general GoB reform but this is not used to drive structural change in DAE. ASIRP re-invents earlier interventions that have not been evaluated. The results of a national Extension Monitoring Survey undertaken by ASIRP present DAE (after limited analysis) with the fact that they are only directly contacting 2% of farmers. After further analysis this is revised to 7.7%. However, the quantity of service and its targeting efficiency is in question. There is no effective service delivery outside of projects. NGO service delivery as an alternative is still largely premised on contracting or tied to micro-credit – large NGO partners become competitors. Performance in terms of quantity of service and access by resource poor farmers has not improved

In 2002- 2003, the direction of ASIRP changes and the road to DAE producing its own Strategic Plan commences. This begins to address the role of DAE, poverty reduction(targeting) and questions aspects of structures and staffing. There remains some issues on the role but the reform is DAEs even if it does not reach 100% of the donor vision “ No more projects but programmes” becomes adopted by GoB and by DAE . The iPRSP of GoB stresses more grass roots participation, local governance and the role of Local Government and infers a clearer well defined role for all sectors (GO,NGO,CBO and the private sector) in extension service delivery . DAE sign a MoU with the Ministry of Local Government

Appendix 1

Where is DAE now based on the factors that influence performance?

1. External Environment

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	The institution has no mechanisms for monitoring and responding to external influence. The responses to external influences are unstructured and reactive. The concept of providing a service to a customer is not on the institution's agenda
2	The institution keeps records on the level of service but fails to use the information to improve performance. There is a sense that the institution is not pro-active in shaping policy. There is a gap in converting plans from developing a strategy to implement a policy.
3	Government policy and institutional objectives are shared and understood. Plans and strategies recognise this.
4	Efficient and effective consultation methods. The service is recognised as efficient and effective by Government and recipients
5	The institution is recognised by Government and recipients as an excellent service provider. The institution informs and influences key external bodies. The strategy and plans of Government are in line with those established by the institution.

2003 – Around 3

2. Vision, Mission and Strategy

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	There is no single statement of the clear purpose of DAE. Different individuals have different views on the purpose. The institution is highly reactive to external influence and pressure. The response is unplanned and immediate. There is a mission statement but no long term vision
2	Legislation/higher level policy and plans define the purpose but this is not updated to reflect changing circumstances. The priorities of GOB and the priorities of recipients of services are different and detract from a clear purpose. There is a belief that clear strategies exist but the problem is that they are not carried through into plans and programmes.
3	There is a mission statement but it is only shared at the higher levels of DAE. Different individuals follow their own plans in fulfilling the mission. Priorities and plans are constrained by competition for resources.
4	The mission statement is supported and understood by all staff. Strategies have been developed and implemented for core areas of DAE operation. The strategies reflect efficient and effective use of resources, and plans reflect the strategy.
5	There is demonstrable progress towards achieving the mission. All strategies, objectives and plans reflect the mission. The strategies reflect best practice and DAE can demonstrate successful implementation and operation of strategies

2003 – Around 2- 3

3. Leadership

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	No distinction between management and leadership. Senior managers appointed for technical or other skills/qualities rather than managerial skills/ Managers are predominantly technocrats and/or lack the specific skills needed
2	The skills of senior managers may be more bureaucratic rather than leadership. There is a recognition of broader management requirements but these requirements may be compartmentalised(e.g. administration) rather than recognised as all senior staff require a minimum level of managerial skill and ability. There is no evidence of communicative/participative styles in discussing strategies and plans.
3	Senior management have broad managerial skills. They have a common vision of the future role DAE. Senior staff are capable of motivating their staff.
4	A cadre of technically and managerially competent senior staff. Managers guide rather than supervise other staff. Openness is encouraged . Teamwork is encouraged.
5	Leaders evolve that are technically and managerially competent. Teams are encouraged to direct their own activities

2003 Around 2

4. Culture

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	People work for the institution because it is a job. There is no sense of belonging or sharing with colleagues. Staff are valued for their length of service rather than competence. Little interest in the quality of service. Some parts of DAE are regarded as more important than others.
2	The concept of service is not supported by other initiatives. Staff loyalty is important. Training programmes and induction courses include modules on values and service standards but performance against these criteria is not used in promotion decisions
3	Senior staff of DAE have identified a number of things it wishes to see improved in relation to the way management and staff view the institution. These are adopted as values. There is an intention to adopt basic standards for service delivery. Recipients of services may be aware that the institution is trying to do something but not convinced that things will improve.
4	Values to be adopted are defined and communicated to all staff. Performance against these values are evaluated and deficiencies are addressed. These values are articulated in service standards for staff and are given to recipients of the service. Recipients of the service will be able to give examples of improved performance
5	Staff identify with DAE and their services. A commitment towards the shared value of quality services. Recipients of service believe that DAE is committed to a high quality service provision.

2003 – Around 3

5. Structure

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	No evidence of organisational design as a process -Structure has not evolved on a planned basis. Reporting relationships tend to be inherited and structure is governed by promotion opportunities or the need to meet individual aspirations. Scope for duplication and confusion between functions. Lack of clarity between the levels - centre/regions and regions/district and districts/upazilas, etc.
2	Attempts to describe the structure but organisation charts do not clearly reflect roles. Recognition that certain reporting relationships need to be reviewed.
3	Management recognise the need to ensure the structure keeps` pace with changing roles. However, changes are often superficial rather than strategic. Reporting lines are clearly understood
4	Structure follows logically from mission, objectives and targets. Structure responds to change
5	The structure reflects the vision and mission and promotes delegation and devolution with short communication chains and effective decision making.. High degree of autonomy with managers empowered to achieve the objectives. Central role emphasises monitoring.

2003 – Around 3

6. Management Practices

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	Technical competence rules. Management responsibilities are neglected. Management is excessively task focused. Functional areas are compartmentalised. Technically competent but under-performing in the use of financial and human resources .
2	Some managers identified and some areas are well managed. Planning is centralised. Directorates have individual targets but do not contribute to institutional objectives.
3	Preferred management style, emphasises institutional values. Planning is based on contributions from all levels and functions. Consistent objectives and targets throughout the institution
4	Training and development opportunities reflect the concern for efficient and effective management practices. Delegation and devolution encouraged for improved performance. Performance monitoring of agreed objectives is a managerial responsibility/accountability
5	Staff take responsibility for their performance and actions. Quality(best) management practices adopted and in operation.

2003 – Around 2

7. Systems

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	Systems inherited from Government. Systems are bureaucratic and controlling rather than informing.
2	Centralised systems aimed at control and monitoring throughout the organisation.. Information is not management oriented
3	Systems designed to meet the needs of DAE. Records are accurate and up to date. Management information is used to monitor performance against key objectives and targets. Quality of analysis and quality of inputs and outputs are part of the system
4	Systems and training support efficiency and effectiveness considerations in the administration of policy
5	Systems produce information that informs and influence strategies /policy

2003 Around 2-3

8. Work Unit Climate

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	Stereotypical view of the interests of .staff. No differentiation of high and poorly performing areas.
2	Staff relations are improved through newsletters and other communications. However, feeling that control of some staff is a problem and difficult to manage.
3	Initiatives to involve staff in solving problems at the workplace. Poor performance is addressed objectively and professionally.
4	Improved performance accepted as necessary. Cross functional problem solving. Management responds effectively to problems - decision making is based on analysis
5	Performance improvement ideas are shared and sub-directorates fully understand the need to meet DAE missions and objectives

2003 Between 1 and 2

9. Task Requirement & Individual Skills

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	Staff carry out job as previous job holder . Staff not allocated task according to skills. Promotion and transfer procedures ad hoc, not transparent . Training and development unplanned and not prioritised.
2	All senior staff have clear job descriptions but they are not emphasising outcomes. Technical training bias. Promotion based on other factors(e.g seniority) and elements of ability
3	Job descriptions include responsibilities .Person specifications related to job. Training is balanced between technical and other. Promotion based on skills and ability.
4	Job descriptions have standards of service and levels to be achieved. Person specification detail qualifications and skills required for effective performance. Training reflects priority of DAE Promotion based on skills, ability and performance
5	Performance targets for job and personal development objectives are agreed and reviewed

2003 Between 1-2

10. Needs, Values and Motivation

<u>Scale Rating</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
1	Just a job. No sanctions against poor time-keeping , absenteeism. No incentives to improve.
2	Improved motivation = improved financial rewards
3	Clear values for staff and communicated during training. Quality is part of the value system. Incentive mechanisms in place.
4	Common shared values . Pay reflects performance. Commitment to quality service
5	Recipients of service recognise quality. Staff action oriented. Rewards based on performance and quality of service given

2003 Between 1-2

Appendix 2

(From The ASIRP Inception Report(1999) with additions/comments by the ASIRP Institutional Development Adviser (2001)

The Exit Strategies and The Stairway to Sustainability

The following list of generic exit strategies was developed from considering the approaches taken by different individuals and elements within the ASSP project. They were used to illustrate the principle that it is possible for any mainly TA based project to take an explicit and deliberate approach towards the issue of sustainability.

Strategy One: “write it down”

Produce and hand over documents that will guide your successors concerning how to continue to do the job effectively.

e.g. Variety Maintenance Manuals, Revised Extension Manual, Thana Planning and other Guidelines.

Conditions for Success / Risks:

- Materials are clear and understandable (in Bangla or English)
- Materials are accessible to the right people (the people who need them)
- Materials are not simply shelved as relating to a deceased project
- Materials continue to be relevant or are updated to reflect changing conditions

Strategy Two: “train those who will remain”

Conduct formal and informal training of counterpart officers from the client organisation who will continue to operate the systems or operational processes established during the project phase.

e.g. TAO Work Programming Training, SEMS Training.

Conditions for Success/ Risks:

- the people who are trained continue to have relevant positions in the organisation
- the training provided (and linked materials) continue to be relevant
- the trainees have correctly understood and absorbed the training and don't need further follow up which may not be available after technical assistance has gone
- subsequent training (e.g. from other projects) will not conflict with or undermine the message
- the right people are nominated for the course

Strategy Three: “build ownership”

Seek to engender ownership of systems and processes especially amongst managers so that they will continue to push for implementation and maintenance after project completion. This may be done through workshops, review meetings and training (including overseas training which, through being highly valued, is sometimes thought to have a strong motivational impact).

e.g. Management Committee Workshops (HRM, Environment, MIS). NAEP awareness raising workshops, Philippines based farmer led extension training, Cox' Bazaar Management Team course

Conditions for Success / Risks

- the understanding and ownership lasts longer than the project contract
- the internal champions of change remain in post and continue to champion change
- there are some “guiding lights” (e.g. documentation of the change process) helping to ensure that the organisation stays on track

Strategy Four: “pin them down”

Identify or seek to have identified specific individuals or teams who will be given formal responsibility for continuing project initiated activities (could include formal inclusion of tasks in job descriptions, specific recruitment and the creation of organisational “cells”).

e.g. NGO Liaison responsibility to go in JDs, Management Committee terms of reference includes specific responsibility for organisational review processes.

Conditions for Success / Risks

- Job descriptions and formal structures and responsibilities are adhered to
- There is adequate operational funding for the new capacity created to take on former project funded roles
- Those given responsibility have the ability and time to fulfil their new role (which may be additional to existing duties) - Small scale support issues are catered for (e.g. copying, PC, telephone) - The identified individual or cell is not isolated from the mainstream organisational structure

Strategy Five: “marshall resources”

Draw other already existing and new resources, including those tied to other projects, into coherence with the project initiated systems so that there is a continuity of resourcing despite the project closing.

e.g. Bring other project activities into EPS and SEMS systems, link ASSP activities to ASIRP project.

Conditions for Success / Risks

- other projects have objectives that are consistent with the project that is ending
- other resources that can be marshalled in support do exist
- the systems are still viewed as project driven, just a different project
- other project directors are willing to adopt systems and processes that they did not “invent”, implies a willingness to compromise and not “re-invent the wheel” that is sometimes lacking

Strategy Six: “plan it in”

Intervene in and support the organisational planning processes (including future project planning) to ensure that project activities or impacts are incorporated and will thus spill over into beyond the project phase (at least up until the end of the planning horizon). For plans and objectives that have a long time horizon (e.g. Policy Documents, Mission Statement and Organisational Vision Statement) this may result in a significant “project afterglow”. Ensure that such documents are widely disseminated before project close. Influencing the nature of the planning process itself may have an even more sustainable impact.

e.g. DAE Mission, NAEP, Thana planning Guidelines, Strategic Plan, building P&E Wing capacity

Conditions for Success / Risks

- assumes that organisational forward planning happens
- assumes an ability to define now what is needed in the future
- plans may be too closely associated with the project and ignored when this closes

Strategy Seven: “culture change”

Seek to encourage a change in the predominant values of the organisation and thereby engender lasting internal support for the change process. Multiple methods of achieving culture change including training and ongoing facilitation may contribute.

e.g. Core Principles of NAEP and measures to promote a fundamentally different style of management in DAE, promoting internal review of culture

Conditions for Success / Risks

- can the appropriate culture for the organisation be defined?
- requires a high degree of homogeneity across the organisation
- inappropriate for an outsider to determine what is the appropriate culture (but could act as a catalyst for an organisation to examine its own culture)
- culture change, if it happens at all, will outlast most project timeframes
- is the broader environment conducive to culture change (broader public sector and political context)

Strategy Eight: “big stick”

Continuing formal conditionally attached to donor funding.

e.g. ongoing freeze on BS recruitment associated with World Bank conditionality.

Conditions for Success / Risks

- a very blunt tool
- likely to undermine ownership of the change process
- only lasts as long as the conditionality remains
- likely to be undermined or subverted

Strategy Nine: “keep external pressure for change high”

Support other local institutions that will continue to exert pressure for organisational change and will provide safeguards against “backsliding” after project completion.

e.g. support to NAEP/NGO partnerships, raise NGO awareness of changing DAE role

Conditions for Success / Risks

- effective as long as these external organisations are trusted/ respected and have some other influence over the client
- external organisations own agenda may not be fully consistent with the project objective of strengthening the client organisation (eg some service delivery NGOs may prefer to see GOs fail)

Strategy Ten: “build client expectations”

Help to raise consumer expectations and thereby sustain the external pressure for organisational transformation.

e.g. NAEP media campaign raising farmer awareness

Conditions for Success / Risks

- customers have an effective voice
- customers have leverage over organisational performance

Strategy Eleven: “rational acceptance”

Seek to reinforce the understanding of fundamental project purpose during the wind - down phase so that new leadership will emerge.

e.g. Addressing Exit Strategy with DAE in Management Committee, strategic issues workshops, open dialogue on sustainability issues

Conditions for Success / Risks

- the level of understanding and acceptance is not vested in too few people
- the successor “change leaders” have the resources needed to continue to support change
- the messages to the client regarding need for sustainable change are consistent

Strategy Twelve: “pressure from above”

Encourage those in positions in the hierarchy above the client organisation in understanding and supporting the longer term project purpose and to provide their active support

e.g. Briefings to secretary/minister, involving secretaries and ministers in project sponsored events

Conditions for Success / Risks

- perception of “bypassing “ the organisation concerned
- effective so long as senior level champions remain in post
- risk of reversal if political environment changes (ie project may be too closely associated with one party or powerful individual)
- ability to effectively brief these individuals may be limited by lack of access (a strong but wrong understanding or rejection of project principles could do more harm than good) No

Strategy Thirteen “build it to last”

The creation of physical infrastructure designed to remain operational long after the end of the project

e.g. establishment of Breeder Seed Units, renovation of ATIs/CERDI

Conditions for Success / Risks

- facilities continue to be maintained and adequate budgets provided for this purpose
- spare parts are available for machinery / equipment
- expertise needed to maintain facilities is available/can be afforded
- facilities are designed to meet future needs

Strategy Fourteen “it was working when I left”

Make sure that all systems and processes are fully operational at the point of project completion

e.g. get SEMS up and running at end of 1998

Conditions for Success / Risks

- operation at project end is no guarantee of continuing operation
- a strategy for exit but not one for sustainability

DAE/DEVELOPMENT PARTNER ROLES IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY

For the exit strategy to be successful the actions of the client organisation and the donor must be consistent with those of the project team.

Client Role (DAE)

- Willingness to engage in constructive dialogue about the project completion and exit process when little short term gain may be perceived for the organisation resulting from this process (rather there may be a loss of resources available for development activities and technical assistance)
- Willingness to make the counterpart officers available throughout the life of the project to be the recipients in the skills transfer process
- Willingness to fill posts, amend structures and supplement budgets where necessary to underpin the sustainability of project impacts
- To be active in encouraging cross project co-ordination and harmonisation of systems and in countering any suggestion within the organisation that project initiated systems will cease with the project
- To critically review internal processes and culture to identify the changes needed to sustain project impacts
- Commitment to take on the leadership of the innovation and reform process

Development Partner Role

- To reinforce the project exit strategy message to the client
- To use donor networks and influence to encourage cross project co-ordination and “marshalling of resources”
- To avoid excessive use of blunt conditionality as something that tends to undermine ownership
- Willingness to take risk in transferring increasing financial responsibility to the client organisation
- Using networks and influence to gain support of higher levels when encouraged to do so as a supportive action by the client (eg contact with political “high ups”)
- Using collective influence to agree a broader reform agenda with the government